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ARTICLES
OUR  ANCHOR  FOR  225  YEARS  AND  COUNTING:
THE  ENDURING  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE
PRECISE  TEXT  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION
Brett M. Kavanaugh*
Thank you so much for inviting me to Notre Dame.  As a Catholic, I
appreciate what this university stands for—a mission of training people, to
educate students to help others of all faiths and backgrounds.  As a Judge, I
appreciate what this esteemed law school has done to train students in the
law, to teach them both the fundamentals and the big picture, to teach them
what to know and how to think.  In the pantheon of great American law
schools, this school stands as one of the finest.
I am so grateful to Dean Newton for welcoming me here.  I thank Ste-
phanie Maloney and the Law Review for their hard work, wonderful organiza-
tion, and gracious hospitality.  I thank my great friend Professor Bill Kelley
for helping to arrange my trip.  Bill and I worked together at three different
times—first in the Solicitor General’s office when he was an Assistant and I
was what is now called a Bristow Fellow, second in Judge Starr’s independent
counsel office in those unpleasant duties, and finally in the White House
when I was Staff Secretary and Bill was Deputy White House Counsel.  There
is no finer public servant and no finer man.  I am grateful to Bill for mentor-
ing me and for his loyal friendship over the years.
The topics we have been discussing today with leading thinkers of the
legal academy are fascinating and important.  What explains constitutional
change in the Supreme Court?  How do we explain and understand past
changes?  How do we predict and know when there is to be future change?
When one comes to Notre Dame, whether for a law review symposium or
for a football game or for both, your mind is drawn to fundamentals and
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and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
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history.  This is a place that oozes history, and in that vein, I want to take a
step back and focus on the text of our Constitution.  I want to focus on that
text in two dimensions.  First, I want to explain how the text of the Constitu-
tion creates a structure—a separation of powers—that protects liberty.  And
in particular, I want to emphasize how that structure tilts toward liberty, how
it creates legislative and executive branches with finely specified powers so as
to protect individual liberty against oppressive legislation.  Second, I want to
focus on the role of the Supreme Court in that constitutional structure—and
how the Court itself looks to the precise words of the constitutional text both
to preserve the separation of powers established by the Constitution and to
protect individual liberty.  My overriding message will be that one factor mat-
ters above all in constitutional interpretation and in understanding the grand
sweep of constitutional jurisprudence—and that one factor is the precise
wording of the constitutional text.  It’s not the only factor, but it’s the
anchor, the magnet, the most important factor that directs and explains
much of constitutional law, particularly in the realm of separation of powers.
I. A SEPARATE LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE: A STRUCTURE
THAT TILTS TOWARD LIBERTY
Let’s begin with the structure established by the text.  The Framers of
the Constitution met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 because of dis-
satisfaction with the weak national government established under the Articles
of Confederation.1  Several problems had become apparent.  The national
government was too weak to defend the territory and security of the United
States.2  The national government had little ability to raise revenue by way of
taxes so as to support the necessary defense efforts.3  And the splintered
nature of the country at that time hindered commerce and trade, including
foreign trade, and thus hindered prosperity.4
A main goal, therefore, was to establish a strong central government able
to protect security and promote prosperity.5  At the same time, the Framers
were keenly aware that the people within this new country consisted of many
factions—those with property and those without, creditors and debtors,
landed interests and manufacturing interests, and moneyed interests and
many lesser interests.  As Madison said in Federalist 10, “The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and
ordinary operations of the government.”6  Madison further explained that
the Constitution had to “secure the public good and private rights” against
1 MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 80–81 (1996). See generally AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HON-
EST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009).
2 BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 80–81.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 81.
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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the danger of majority rule while “at the same time to preserve the spirit and
the form of popular government.”7
How to do this?  How to create a strong central government without
infringing on individual rights?  Did the Framers in Philadelphia simply dic-
tate a bill of rights to protect individuals from the majority?  No.  That was
not the first order of business because the Framers understood that a bill of
rights without a structure to protect those rights would be largely meaning-
less.  As a practical matter, such a bill of rights would be precatory for individ-
ual legislators and executives.  The danger to liberty, the Framers knew, was
concentration of power.  As Madison explained in Federalist 47, “The accumu-
lation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”8  Madison
explained that tyranny could come from a single executive in whom all pow-
ers are concentrated, or from a legislature that assembles all power in its
hands, the definition of despotic government.  So what is the opposite of
concentration of power?  Separation of power.  Madison explained that “the
preservation of liberty” requires that the “three great departments of power
should be separate and distinct.”9
Consistent with Madison’s observations, we often remark that the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers protects liberty.  We say that structure protects
liberty.
But what do we mean by that?  I think people often say that without
really thinking about what it means.  Do we know what those high-minded
platitudes mean in practice?  How exactly does the separation of powers pro-
tect liberty?
First we need to know what we mean by liberty.  And while there are
many different conceptions of liberty, the liberty protected by the separation
of powers in the Constitution is primarily freedom from government oppres-
sion, in particular from the effects of legislation that would unfairly prohibit
or mandate certain action by individual citizens, backed by punishment.
There is certainly a conception of positive liberty—of entitlement to certain
government benefits or support.  And legislatures are equipped under our
constitutional structure to provide that kind of benefit.  But that is not what
we are usually referring to when we say that the separation of powers protects
liberty.  The separation of powers primarily protects freedom from govern-
ment action.
So we know what liberty we are referring to.  How does the Constitu-
tion’s structure protect liberty?  To answer that question we need to read the
text.
In order to protect individual liberty and guard against the whim of
majority rule, the Framers first made it very difficult to enact laws.  There
would be no one person—no king or queen—who could simply declare the
7 Id. at 50.
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
9 Id. at 246.
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law.10  Likewise, there would be no one body of legislators who could enact
laws.11  Rather, the Framers required the concurrence of three separate enti-
ties to enact legislation: the House, the Senate, and the President.12  They
provided, of course, for the possibility of the Legislature’s overriding a presi-
dential veto, but only with the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of
Congress.13
In order to enact tax laws, or to prohibit certain activities, or to regulate
commerce, the national government would require action by three separate
entities.  In order to pass, legislation would require consensus and broad sup-
port.  The system was designed to be difficult.  Keep this in mind today.  The
Framers wanted it to be hard to pass legislation.  Legislation that attained
broad support was less likely to be oppressive—to unfairly benefit one faction
at the expense of another.  We can talk about whether we should alter that
process by constitutional amendment, but the Constitution as ratified made
legislation difficult to pass.
And there was more.  Hard as it would be to enact legislation, the Fram-
ers were not content to rely on the protections of bicameralism and present-
ment alone.  For laws that regulate private individuals and entities—laws that
tell you that you cannot do something or must do something, backed by
threat of an executive enforcement action and criminal punishment or civil
sanctions—an enforcement entity separate from the Legislature would have
to decide to in fact prosecute the violation of that law.  This separate enforce-
ment entity would be the President of the United States, as assisted by
subordinate officers in the executive branch.14  This is what we call the Exec-
utive’s prosecutorial discretion—the ability to decide whether to prosecute
violations and violators of certain laws.15
The Executive was simultaneously given an extraordinary and unfettered
power to pardon.16  Think about that: in one person alone is vested the
power to pardon violations of federal law.  And you might think, well, that is
an enormous power to leave to one person; how does that make sense given
that the Framers were so concerned about such a concentration of power?
But it’s actually consistent with the Framers’ design when you keep in mind
that the pardon power works only in the direction of liberty—it’s a check to
decide to protect someone’s liberty against enforcement of what the Execu-
10 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
11 Id.
12 Id. art. I, § 7.
13 Id.
14 See id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted . . . .”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution gives the executive branch prosecutorial power).
15 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“It follows, as an inci-
dent of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the
free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their
control over criminal prosecutions.”).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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tive deems an oppressive law, even if a prior Executive had decided to prose-
cute the individual for violating the law.
So as an individual citizen, your liberty—your freedom from coercive
federal government action—cannot be infringed until legislation is enacted,
which requires the concurrence of three entities—and until the Executive
makes a separate, independent decision to prosecute violations of those laws.
This system of multiple checks makes it even harder for a majority faction to
exercise coercive power against individual citizens.
In its design and structure, the Constitution is tilted in the direction of
liberty.
Now on this prosecutorial discretion point, some might initially think
that the Executive has a duty to prosecute violators of every law, at least if
there are resources to do so.  Some might say that it’s not for the President to
decide not to prosecute violators of a law that Congress has duly enacted.  In
my view, the history and structure of the Constitution do not support that
proposition.  To be sure, the President has the duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.  That certainly means that the Executive has to follow
and comply with laws regulating the executive branch—at least unless the
President deems the law unconstitutional, in which event the President can
decline to follow the statute until a final court order says otherwise.  In other
words, the Executive does have to follow laws regulating the executive
branch.  But the Take Care Clause has not traditionally been read to man-
date executive prosecution of all violators of all federal laws.17
Our leading historical example is President Jefferson and the Sedition
Act.  We all know the rough outlines of the Sedition Act.  In 1798, in the
throes of the U.S. war against France, Congress supported by President
Adams passed a law that said it would be a crime punishable by fine and up to
two years imprisonment to “write, print, utter or publish,” or cause it to be
done, or assist in “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the
government of the United States, or either House of Congress, or the Presi-
dent, with intent to defame, or bring either into contempt or disrepute,”
among other things.18  After he became President in 1801, President Jeffer-
son decided that he would no longer pursue prosecutions against violators of
the Sedition Act, against those who spoke ill of the government or high offi-
cials in that way.  Most accept that Jefferson did not violate the Take Care
Clause when he made that decision.  The Take Care Clause encompasses at
least some degree of prosecutorial discretion; it does not prohibit
prosecutorial discretion.19
17 See, e.g., Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (noting that the President, through the Attorney Gen-
eral who acts as the “hand of the President,” retains “the free exercise of the discretionary
powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions”).
See generally In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
18 Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
19 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed . . . .”); Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (noting that the President, through the Take
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But you may still have a nagging doubt, as I often do when I think about
this issue.  Does the President really have the power to decline to prosecute a
violator of a law simply because of the President’s belief that the law is
oppressive?  In my view, those nagging doubts largely go away when we con-
sider the implications of the pardon power, and the interaction of the powers
of prosecutorial discretion and the pardon power.20  Everyone agrees that
the pardon power gives the President absolute, unfettered, unchecked power
to pardon every violator of every federal law.21  Obviously, there are political
checks against doing that, or against using the pardon power in an arbitrary
manner.22  But in terms of raw constitutional power, that is the power the
President has.
Moreover, it is long settled that the power to pardon includes the power
to pardon violations of a law at any time after commission of the act.23  In
other words, a pardon does not need to wait for a conviction.
Now if the President has the absolute discretion to pardon individuals at
any time after commission of the illegal act, it necessarily seems to follow that
the President has the corresponding power not to prosecute those individu-
als in the first place.  After all, it would not make any sense to require the
filing of a criminal indictment followed by a pardon instead of simply
allowing the Executive not to file the criminal indictment in the first place.
As Akhil Amar has cogently explained, the greater power to pardon encom-
passes the lesser power to decline to prosecute in the first place.24
At the same time that the Framers tilted toward liberty with the
prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers, the Framers also created a
check against unilateral executive decisions to restrain someone’s physical
liberty.  In particular, Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution protects the
Care Clause, has “free exercise of the discretionary powers . . . over criminal
prosecutions”).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”).
21 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (“The power thus conferred [by the
Constitution] is unlimited, with the exception stated. . . . This power of the President is not
subject to legislative control.  Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.”).
22 See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 106 (1925) (“[T]he Constitution does establish a
system of checks and that the pardoning power does furnish a potential check upon some
judicial actions.  If the President abuses this power he may be impeached.  It is, however,
no more inherently unreasonable that the President should have the power to pardon
criminal contempts than that he should have the power to pardon treason.”).
23 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (“[The President’s pardon power] extends to every
offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either
before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judg-
ment.”); see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 104 (“The President may pardon all offenses
against the United States except in cases of impeachment.”).
24 AMAR, supra note 1, at 187–89.
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right of habeas corpus, which allows executive detention only pursuant to
laws passed by Congress, except in certain carefully cabined circumstances.25
So what is the unifying theme between the pardon and prosecutorial
discretion powers on the one hand and the habeas corpus right on the
other?  The former grants unilateral power to the President.26  The latter
forbids unilateral power by the President.27  What is the connective tissue?
The answer is liberty.  The constitutional structure is tilted toward liberty.
The President can act unilaterally to protect liberty and free or protect some-
one from imprisonment; but with limited exceptions, the President cannot
act, except pursuant to statute, to infringe liberty and imprison a citizen.
So the text of the Constitution creates a separation between the legisla-
tive power and the executive power.28  And to enact legislation, moreover,
the Constitution requires the concurrence of three separate entities.29  A pri-
mary protection of liberty in our constitutional structure comes from the
Framers’ decisions on structure, decisions that we see when we read Article
I30 and Article II of the Constitution.31  Those checks are central to protect-
ing liberty.
And make no mistake, although resort to the precise constitutional text
is sometimes dismissed as anachronistic, that precise constitutional text still
controls how Congress and the President operate.32  A President cannot say,
well, the Constitution is outdated and has not adapted to the needs of the
times, so I am going to ignore Congress and unilaterally decree a new crimi-
nal law prohibiting possession of certain semi-automatic rifles.  Or I am going
to ignore Congress and unilaterally pass a new decree banning forms of abor-
tion.  A Senate cannot say that the House of Representatives is too extreme
and not representative of the population at large, so we the Senate are going
to ignore the House and join with the President in passing some new tax
legislation.  The House cannot say that the Senate is outdated and should be
bypassed because having two Senators per state regardless of population—
giving the same number of votes to Delaware and California—violates the
one-person, one-vote principle, so we the House are just going to ignore the
Senate and join with the President in passing new environmental laws.
That does not happen—and it cannot lawfully happen.  The precise text
of the Constitution controls our structure, and we do not ignore the text of
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”).
26 See id. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
27 See id. art. I., § 9.
28 See id. § 1 (vesting legislative powers in the U.S. Congress); id. art. II, § 1 (vesting
the executive power in the President of the United States).
29 See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
30 See id. art. I.
31 See id. art. II.
32 See id. art. I (prescribing the legislative powers of the U.S. Congress); id. art. II
(prescribing the executive power of the President).
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the Constitution simply because it was ratified 225 years ago, or may be out-
dated, or has not adapted to modern conditions.33
To be sure, the Constitution is not fixed in stone.  There is an amend-
ment process, articulated in Article V.34  And that amendment process is
meant to be used.  The Twelfth Amendment,35 the Seventeenth Amend-
ment,36 and the Twenty-Second Amendment,37 to take three examples, have
worked dramatic changes in our constitutional structure.  But the text
controls.
Even with all of those structural protections of liberty in place at the
time of the Founding, concerns were raised in some quarters about the lack
of a bill of rights.  So the First Congress and the states decided to add a series
of individual rights to the Constitution, what are now the First through
Eighth Amendments.38
Even without a bill of rights, of course, the Legislature always has the
power to decline to enact legislation for any reason, including that it violates
principles that we care about: the freedom of speech,39 or the freedom to
keep arms,40 or the protection against cruel and unusual punishments,41 or
33 See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004).
34 U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”).
35 Id. amend. XII (ratified June 15, 1804, the Twelfth Amendment outlined the pro-
cess for electing the President: “The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant
of the same state with themselves . . . . The person having the greatest number of votes for
President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the
highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot, the President.”).
36 Id. amend. XVII (ratified April 8, 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment established
direct election of U.S. Senators by popular vote: “The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years . . . .”).
37 Id. amend. XXII, § 1 (ratified February 27, 1951, the Twenty-Second Amendment
imposed a term limit on the President: “No person shall be elected to the office of the
President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as
President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected
President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once . . . .”).
38 See id. amends. I–VIII.
39 Id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
40 Id. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
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any other value or policy the Legislature deems important.42  Now one could
assume that future Congresses would always keep these values in mind, or at
least have some very good reason to depart from them.  But the First Con-
gress wanted to establish some red lines in the constitutional text, over which
future Congresses and Presidents could not cross, absent constitutional
amendment.
So the Constitution was amended to tilt even further toward liberty.
So what is the significance and practical importance of having all of this
written in the constitutional text?  That’s where the next chapter of our story
begins.
II. THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: A FURTHER TILT TOWARD LIBERTY
The text of the Constitution tilts toward liberty in still another critically
important way.  Even in cases where a law is passed and the Executive prose-
cutes individual violators, the Congress and the Executive do not have the
last word.  Rather, the Constitution creates and empowers an independent
Judiciary that has the power (with a jury) in justiciable cases to determine
whether someone has in fact violated the law as alleged by the Executive.43
Even more importantly, the Judiciary has the final word to independently
determine whether the law itself violates the text of the Constitution in some
way, for example, as a violation of habeas corpus44 or as exceeding Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.45
Check after check after check after check.  Bicameralism, presentment,
executive discretion, pardon power, and on top of that independent judicial
and jury determination of the facts, and independent judicial determination
of the constitutionality of the law.  Before the coercive power of the state may
act upon you as an individual citizen, so many different checkpoints must be
passed.  Why?  To protect individual liberty.  To guard against faction, as
Madison said.46  To protect the minority against the majority, while at the
same time creating a system that could function to protect security and
enhance prosperity.
So the Constitution’s structure protects liberty.  The primary protection
of individual liberty in our constitutional system comes from the separation
of powers in the Constitution: the separation of the power to legislate from
the power to enforce from the power to adjudicate.47  But it took a critical
41 Id. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (emphasis added)).
42 See, e.g., id. art. I, §§ 7–8.
43 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
45 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 557 (1995).
46 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
47 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“One
of the principal objections . . . to the Constitution, is . . . that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments [are] separate and distinct . . . . [N]o regard . . . seems to have been
paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty.”).
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moment early in our constitutional system to cement these principles firmly
into the U.S. Reports.
The case was Marbury v. Madison.48  We all have studied the case in law
school, and we all think we know what it means.  But in many ways, I think we
spend too little time on Marbury v. Madison in the academy and in the legal
profession.  I think every time we re-read the text of the Constitution, which
we should do regularly—and I mean word for word—we should also re-read
Marbury v. Madison at the same time.  For that case has profound lessons to
this day about the status of the Constitution, how to interpret the Constitu-
tion, and the Judiciary’s role vis-a`-vis other branches in interpreting the
Constitution.
From the early days of the Constitution, the courts were called upon to
address claims by individuals that their rights were being impeded in viola-
tion of the Constitution.49  And the judges therefore were called upon to
have a method of assessing such claims, of interpreting and applying the
Constitution.  And from the beginning, the most important aspect of consti-
tutional interpretation was not one’s political philosophy, not one’s policy
views, but rather what were the precise words of the constitutional text.50
We all know that Marbury stands for the basic proposition that courts
may review laws as applied in individual cases to determine whether the laws
square with the Constitution: the power of judicial review.51  But in the
course of articulating that principle, Chief Justice Marshall opined on a num-
ber of critical points of constitutional interpretation that remain salient to
this day.
Recall the basic facts.  William Marbury had been nominated by Presi-
dent Adams to be a judge on the local D.C. court, which given D.C.’s unique
status in the Constitution was a federal office that at that time carried a fixed
term of five years.52  Marbury had been confirmed by the Senate, and Presi-
dent Adams had signed his commission.  But at the time President Jefferson
took office in March 1801, Marbury had not yet received his commission,
which had languished in the Secretary of State’s office.53  The question was
whether delivery of the commission was necessary for Marbury’s appoint-
ment;54 if so, then President Jefferson had no intention of delivering the
commission and allowing Marbury to serve as a judge.55
48 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
49 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding that the President
does not have inherent authority to ignore a law passed by Congress); Stuart v. Laird, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (sustaining the Judiciary Act of 1802).
50 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUS-
TICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 222–38 (1995) (detailing the methods of
constitutional interpretation employed by the early Court).
51 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–79.
52 Id. at 154–55.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 157.
55 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1,
4.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 11 30-MAY-14 13:52
2014] our  anchor  for 225  years  and  counting 1917
Marbury filed for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court.56  Chief
Justice Marshall wrote the unanimous opinion.57  And let’s put aside the
question of what issues he should have reached, which itself is an interesting
topic, but let’s look at the issues he did reach and how he analyzed the issues.
Chief Justice Marshall first considered the question of whether Marbury
had been validly appointed to his position as a D.C. judge.58  How to analyze
that question?  Marshall began with the precise wording of the Constitution.
He quoted Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution: “The president shall
nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for.”59  And he quoted Article II, Section 3, which states that the President
“shall commission all the officers of the United States.”60
Reading that text, Marshall explained that the Constitution creates three
separate steps before a principal officer is officially appointed—presidential
nomination, Senate confirmation, and then the President’s commissioning
the officer.61  In other words, just because you are confirmed by the Senate
does not make you an officer; the President has one final discretionary step
to complete, namely, the commissioning of the officer.  At that point, the
President could decide not to commission the officer, and the individual
would not be appointed, notwithstanding having been nominated and con-
firmed.  Keep that in mind for your future judicial appointment.  After the
Senate confirms you, make sure the President signs the commission.
But the next issue in Marbury concerned when an appointment is com-
plete: when the President signs the commission or when the commission is
delivered to the office holder.62  President Jefferson’s view was that the
appointment was not complete until the commission was delivered to the
office holder.  Should the Supreme Court defer to the President’s view on
that question?  Marshall said no.  It was the duty of the courts to say what the
law is, and in a justiciable case where an individual claims that the President
has acted in a manner contrary to the Constitution, the Court has the final
word, not the President.63
This is a critical aspect of Marbury that is often overlooked.  The Court
not only has the power of judicial review of legislation (as we will see); it also
has the power to reject the President’s interpretation of the Constitution.64
56 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 155.
59 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
60 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
61 Id. at 155–56.
62 Id. at 159–61.
63 Id. at 177.
64 See id. at 172–73 (rejecting Jefferson’s assertion that the commission only became
complete upon delivery).
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And to analyze the question of when the appointment was complete—at
the commission’s signing or at delivery—Marshall resorted to ordinary prin-
ciples of interpretation, using the text, history, and structure of the Constitu-
tion, not to mention some common sense—to answer this ambiguity.  He
concluded ultimately that the appointment was final when the commission
was signed, stating:
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has
been made.  But having once made the appointment, his power over the
office is terminated in all cases, where, by law, the officer is not removable by
him.  The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the
absolute, unconditional, power of accepting or rejecting it.65
So from this aspect of Marbury, we find two bedrock points: First, the Court
will not simply defer to the views of the President on a question of constitu-
tional interpretation.66  And second, in resolving questions of constitutional
controversy, the Court will look to and heed the actual wording, the precise
words, of the Constitutional text and the structure created by that text.67  So
Marbury, the Court reasoned, was entitled to hold the office for a term of five
years and was entitled to a writ of mandamus.68
But there still were other questions for the Marbury Court to resolve, in
particular: Was the Supreme Court the appropriate body to issue the writ of
mandamus?69  A statute—the Judiciary Act of 1789—gave the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over such mandamus actions.70  But was that stat-
ute consistent with the Constitution?
How did Marshall resolve that question?  He went back to the constitu-
tional text and began by quoting Article III of the Constitution: “The
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassa-
dors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a
party.  In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.”71
As Marshall noted, it had been argued that Congress had the authority
to add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because the Consti-
tution did not expressly prohibit Congress from doing so.72  But Marshall
would have none of that.
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where
the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original
65 Id. at 162.
66 See id. at 167 (“The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature,
judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority.”).
67 See id. at 177–78.
68 Id. at 162.
69 Id. at 168 (“It remains to be enquired whether . . . [h]e is entitled to the remedy for
which he applies.  This depends on . . . the power of this court.”).
70 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73.
71 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2).
72 Id.
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jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the dis-
tribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects
than those affirmed; and, in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be
given to them or they have no operation at all.73
So Marshall concluded that the statutory grant of jurisdiction was contrary to
the Constitution.74
One final question remained, however: the provision giving the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over mandamus actions had been
enacted by Congress in the famed Judiciary Act of 1789.75  Could the
Supreme Court in essence declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and
decline to follow it?76
Marshall said that was “a question deeply interesting to the United
States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.”77
In resolving that question, Marshall made many observations about the
nature of the Constitution that bear repeating:
Marshall made clear that the Constitution was not just an aspirational
statement of principles, but rather was law.78  It was written law that was to be
interpreted according to traditional principles for interpreting written law.79
At the same time, the Constitution was superior to ordinary legislation.80
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns,
to different departments, their respective powers. . . .
. . . The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? . . .
. . . The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like
other acts, is alterable . . . .
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act con-
trary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a
power, in its own nature illimitable.81
But did the Court have the power to enforce its understanding of the
Constitution against a contrary interpretation by the Legislature?
Marshall took the question head on:
73 Id.
74 Id. at 176.
75 See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. at 81.
76 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 176–77.
79 See id. at 174, 176–80.
80 Id. at 178.
81 Id. at 176–77.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-MAY-14 13:52
1920 notre dame law review [vol. 89:5
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conform-
ably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of the very essence
of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitu-
tions.  It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obli-
gatory.  It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly
forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality
effectual.  It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipo-
tence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within
narrow limits.  It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be
passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest
improvement on political institutions—a written constitution—would of
itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed
with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.82
Marshall then went on to give many examples of how judicial review had to
be part and parcel of a constitutional system with a written Constitution, a
parade of horribles that could ensue if the written Constitution was unen-
forceable in court.  He noted that the Constitution declared that “no tax or
duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.”83  He hypothesized a
tax on “export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour,” and asked, “Ought judg-
ment to be rendered in such a case?  [O]ught the judges to close their eyes
on the constitution, and only see the law[?]”84  Marshall pointed out that the
Constitution provided that “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.”85  And he asked: Suppose “such a bill should be passed and a person
should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those vic-
tims whom the constitution endeavours to preserve?”86
Marshall summed up:
82 Id. at 177–78.
83 Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84 Id.
85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Id.
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From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is
apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument,
as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? . . .
How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instru-
ments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to
support!
. . . .
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreably [sic] to the
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his
government?  [I]f it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery.87
Marshall concluded with a textual and structural point:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned;
and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all writ-
ten constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.88
So what are the primary lessons of Marbury v. Madison?
First, Marbury reminds us that the point of the Constitution is to estab-
lish a paramount law that will govern and trump ordinary legislation:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future gov-
ernment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been
erected.  The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can
it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated.  The principles, therefore, so
established, are deemed fundamental. . . .
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns,
to different departments, their respective powers.  It may either stop here; or
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description.  The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose
are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writ-
ing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?  The distinction, between a government with limited and unlim-
ited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom
they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obli-
gation.  It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.  The constitution
is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is
87 Id. at 179–80.
88 Id. at 180.
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on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act con-
trary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a
power, in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.89
Second, on matters of constitutional interpretation—in that case, the
question of whether an appointment was final when the commission was
signed or delivered90—the Judiciary will not defer to the President.91  The
Judiciary exercises its own independent judgment in a justiciable case involv-
ing an individual’s right and will enforce its own interpretation of the Consti-
tution in a justiciable case.  After Marbury, probably the two most significant
cases in which the Judiciary stood up to the President were Youngstown92 and
United States v. Nixon.93  In both cases, the President asserted a particular
interpretation of the Constitution.94  In both cases, the stakes were enor-
mously high.  In both cases, the Supreme Court stated in essence: we respect
the views of the President, but we do not agree with his constitutional inter-
pretation, and we therefore rule against him.  He cannot seize the steel mills
in the face of a congressional prohibition.95  He cannot protect the Water-
gate tapes under a claim of absolute executive privilege.96  Likewise, to Presi-
dent Clinton in Clinton v. Jones,97 the Court stated, we disagree with you that
Article II of the Constitution provides a temporary immunity from private
civil suits while in office.
Third, on matters of constitutional interpretation—in that case, the
question of whether Congress had appropriately defined the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court—the Judiciary will not defer to Congress.98  The
89 Id. at 176–77.
90 Id. at 162.
91 Id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”).
92 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
93 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
94 Id. at 703–05 (noting the President’s claim of executive privilege); Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 587 (noting the President’s asserted interpretations of the Vesting Clause and of
the President’s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces).
95 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (holding that the seizing of the steel mills was
unconstitutional).
96 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686–87, 707.
97 520 U.S. 681, 692 (1997) (“Petitioner’s principal submission—that ‘in all but the
most exceptional cases,’ the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from
civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office—cannot
be sustained on the basis of precedent.” (internal citation omitted)).
98 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–75 (1803).
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Judiciary exercises its own independent judgment in a justiciable case.  This,
too, is a power the courts have exercised to the present day.  To the Congress
that enacted the Military Commissions Act,99 the Court said: we disagree with
you about the reach of the habeas corpus writ at Guantanamo.100  Similarly,
to the Congress that enacted the Affordable Care Act,101 the Court said: we
disagree with you that the Commerce,102 Necessary and Proper,103 or Tax
Clauses104 support a mandate to purchase a product or service.  However,
the Court ultimately did conclude that the statute could be read simply to
impose only a tax incentive and not a legal mandate.105  In the same case, the
Court said: we disagree with you, Congress, that the federal government may
coerce the states into losing their existing Medicaid funding if they fail to
expand as directed in the Affordable Care Act.106
Fourth, in exercising its own independent judgment when analyzing the
Constitution, the Court will focus intently on the precise words of the consti-
tutional text.  The Marbury Court did not ask what the best way to do things
was.  It did not seek to find the best policy.  It might be, after all, that an
appointment should be considered final after the Senate confirmation vote,
or from the other direction, only when the commission is delivered.  But the
Court did not weigh such questions of policy.  The Court asked what the
precise words of the Constitution said, and the Court reasoned from the text
of the document and the structure of the document established by that
text.107
III. MARBURY’S SHADOW
It’s my submission that Marbury v. Madison continues to mark the proper
approach for constitutional interpretation.
99 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
100 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008) (holding that the Military Commis-
sions Act was not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus).
101 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
102 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.)
(“The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because they elected
to refrain from commercial activity.  Such a law cannot be sustained under a clause author-
izing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”).
103 Id. at 2593 (holding that the individual mandate cannot be upheld under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause).
104 Id. at 2599 (“A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recog-
nized category of direct tax.”).
105 Id. at 2600 (“[I]mposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful
choice to do or not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that
choice.”).
106 Id. at 2608 (“[T]he Medicaid expansion . . . portion of the Affordable Care Act
violates the Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding.”).
107 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (stating that “the particular
phraseology of the [C]onstitution” dictates the case’s outcome).
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To be sure, there have been eras where some have suggested that the
courts should exercise extreme deference to the Legislature.  This view is
associated with Professor Thayer, Justice Frankfurter, and many others, but
the fundamental flaw with this degree of constitutional deference is that it
entails abdication of a constitutional responsibility assigned to the Judici-
ary.108  As John Marshall stated, why even bother to have a constitution if it
cannot be independently enforced by the Judiciary in individual cases?109  To
exercise their responsibilities and oaths, Marshall explained, courts cannot
simply defer to the President’s or Congress’s interpretation of the
Constitution.110
There are also areas where people claim that the precise words of the
constitutional text do not matter or should not bind us.  Indeed, there are
some people today who think we should not be bound by the outmoded and
outdated text. Marbury, of course, rejects that notion as well.111  And, in my
judgment, the Supreme Court throughout our history has rejected that
notion and has insisted on the binding status of the constitutional text as law.
Think of some modern examples from the last fifty years:
Consider Powell v. McCormack,112 from 1969.  The question was whether
the House could exclude Adam Clayton Powell from the seat to which he had
been elected.113  The text of the Constitution lists only three apparent quali-
fications for being a House member: twenty-five years of age, seven years as a
citizen, and an inhabitant of the state from which the representative is
elected.114  In deciding the case, Chief Justice Warren, writing for seven Jus-
tices of the Court—let me repeat, Chief Justice Warren, writing for seven
Justices of the Court—conducted an extensive analysis of the Constitution’s
text and history, and the Convention and ratification debates.115  And the
Court said that its analysis “has demonstrated that in judging the qualifica-
tions of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications pre-
scribed in the Constitution.”116  Text matters.
Or consider the 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, not the part about the
constitutionality under the First Amendment of the campaign finance restric-
tions, but rather the constitutionality of the structure of the Federal Election
Commission.117  This was, of course, an entity developed in the heyday of
108 See, e.g., Alfred S. Neely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s Iconography of Judging, 82 KY. L.J. 535
(1994) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s adjudicative methods, including criticisms of his
extensive deference to Congress); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (discussing the history of the
American constitutional doctrine and arguing for a more limited power of judicial review).
109 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 151.
110 See id.
111 Id. at 180.
112 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
113 Id. at 489.
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
115 Powell, 395 U.S. at 532–47.
116 Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
117 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109–43 (1976).
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new-fangled, good-government institutions, which were in fashion in the
1970s and produced ugly first cousins to the Federal Election Commission,
such as the independent counsel statute.118  The statute in question in Buck-
ley created a Federal Election Commission, with two members selected by the
Speaker of the House, two members appointed by the Senate, and two mem-
bers appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by both houses of
Congress (I guess confirmation by one house was not enough).119
The Court—in part of its eight-Justice per curiam opinion, which all the
Justices joined—held the Federal Election Commission unconstitutional
under the Appointments Clause.120  Listen to the words of the Court, and
keep in mind that this opinion includes Justices from Rehnquist to Brennan
to Marshall:
The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generaliza-
tion in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they
drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. . . . But there is no need to
read the Appointments Clause contrary to its plain language . . . . We are . . .
told . . . that Congress had good reason for not vesting in a Commission
composed wholly of Presidential appointees the authority to administer the
Act . . . . But such fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant a
distortion of the Framers’ work.121
Text matters.
Recall the 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha.122  This was the case dealing
with the constitutionality of the legislative veto.  Legislative vetoes were the
provisions that Congress, in the wake of the New Deal, routinely put into
legislation in order to allow either one or both houses of Congress to vote
down a particular agency action without going through the bicameralism and
presentment procedures specified by the text of the Constitution.  The basic
idea behind the legislative veto, in other words, was: “Hey, things have
changed since the Founding, so we should not be bound by that outdated
text of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses.”  Well, a large majority of
the Supreme Court said, “No.”123  Again, listen to the Court’s words, written
by Chief Justice Burger, and joined by Justice Brennan and others:
[Some] undertake[ ] to make a case for the proposition that the one-House
veto is a useful ‘political invention’ . . . .  But policy arguments supporting
118 The independent counsel statute is the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 49, 591–99 (2006) (creating an independent counsel to investigate members of the
executive branch, as determined necessary by the Attorney General); see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the process of appointing
the independent counsel, as set forth in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978). See gener-
ally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1454 (2009); Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel,
86 GEO. L.J. 2133 (1998).
119 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
120 Id. at 140.
121 Id. at 124, 127, 134.
122 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
123 Id. at 959.
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even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the Constitu-
tion which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how
those powers are to be exercised. . . . [T]he prescription for legislative action
in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power
of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.124
Text matters.
Let’s remember the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowsher v. Synar.125  There,
the Court considered the constitutionality of the position of Comptroller
General of the United States, who performed executive functions but could
be removed only by the Congress.126  In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
which Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor joined, the Court
held the restrictions on removal of the Comptroller General unconstitu-
tional.127  The Court noted that it had been argued that “ ‘[r]ealistic consid-
eration’ of the ‘practical result of the removal provision’” meant that “the
Comptroller General is unlikely to be removed by Congress.”128  The Court
responded: “The separated powers of our Government cannot be permitted
to turn on judicial assessment of whether an officer exercising executive
power is on good terms with Congress.  The Framers recognized that, in the
long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to pre-
serving liberty.”129  Text matters.
Then there is Clinton v. City of New York, the line-item veto case decided
in 1998.130  This was an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, among others.  The Court stated: “Congress
cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, §7, without amending the
Constitution.”131  Text matters.
Those landmark decisions show us that in structural and separation of
powers cases, the text is critical.  Contemporary standards of what’s good or
decent or efficient do not control; the precise text of the Constitution con-
trols.  This constitutional textualism is not the unique province of the so-
called conservative judges.  Judges of all supposed ideological stripes have
paid close attention to the text in structural and separation of powers cases.
And these cases exemplify that textualism—constitutional textualism and
statutory textualism—is politically and policy neutral when applied across the
board.
To be sure, the constitutional text does not answer all questions.  Some-
times the constitutional text is ambiguous, such as the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses.  No doubt that’s true.  But in far fewer places than one
124 Id. at 945, 951.
125 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
126 Id. at 717.
127 Id. at 736.
128 Id. at 730 (quoting from Justice White’s dissent) (internal citation omitted).
129 Id.
130 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
131 Id. at 446.
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would think.  As I like to say to my law clerks and my students, we should not
strain to find ambiguity in clarity.  And even in those areas where there is
true ambiguity, that should not mean “anything goes.”  Just because there are
two reasonable readings of a constitutional provision or a statute does not
mean that the gates are open to a completely free-form approach.
Some argue that a textualist approach means a cramped approach to
individual liberty.  I do not agree.  Separation of powers cases are about pro-
tecting individual liberty, as the Court has often reminded us.132  But even
apart from that, when the constitutional text expressly protects an individual
liberty—think of the Takings Clause, or Free Exercise of Religion Clause, or
Confrontation Clause, or Right to Counsel Clause—then the courts cannot
subtract from that.  The text is actually a bulwark against watering down key
protections of our liberty that are expressly set forth in the Constitution.
Before I conclude, it bears a brief mention, of course, that most struc-
tural and separation of powers disputes never reach court.  And in those
areas, most interestingly, the relevant political actors and the public tend not
just to be textualists, but hyper-textualists.
When I met with Senator Byrd in my confirmation process—after we
compared notes about our daughters, mine at the time being one year old
and his being sixty-eight and sixty-four years old—he pulled out the Constitu-
tion and read to me word-for-word Article I, Section 9’s language about the
power of the purse.  Why did he do that?  Because text matters (and because
Senator Byrd cared a lot about the power of the purse).
In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts famously said that
the role of the judge is to be an umpire—to call balls and strikes the same
way, no matter who is up at bat.133  Of course, a fundamental premise of the
vision of the judge as umpire is that the definition of the strike zone is the
same for each umpire.  And in modern constitutional law, as in modern base-
ball, unfortunately, some umpires employ a different strike zone in some
cases.  As enduring constitutionalists argue, however, paying close attention
to the precise words of the constitutional text is a mainstream and long
accepted mode of constitutional interpretation.134  It is a strike zone we can
all agree on.  Employing it helps us achieve the ideal of the judge as umpire,
respect the proper role of the Judiciary that our Framers envisioned, and
protect individual liberty.  Text matters.
132 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); City of New York, 524 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (state-
ment of Judge John G. Roberts).
134 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW (2012); Amy Coney
Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 155 (2010); William K.
Kelley, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1601, 1604–07
(2012).
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